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INTRODUCTION 
Judges in virtually every kind of legal system on every continent 
draw on international legal materials as they explain and rationalize 
their decisions. Indeed, “international law in domestic courts” has 

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become a thriving subfield overlapping comparative and international 
law.1 The articulation of domestic with international law is of primary 
importance from the international law point of view because 
“international law still relies on domestic legal and political structures 
for implementation.”2 Comparativists search for common patterns or 
themes in how domestic judges deploy international law in resolving 
disputes. Scholars have theorized why domestic judges invoke 
international law and explored the ways in which they use it.3 But 
previous work tends to focus on treaties, though international law is 
also to be found in custom, general principles, judicial decisions, and 
legal scholarship. Existing research also generally bases its findings 
on relatively small numbers of decisions that cite international law.  
In this Study, I use a database of approximately 1600 decisions from 
three national courts spanning up to twenty years to explore the use of 
multiple sources of international law by domestic courts and to 
examine the mix of sources that appear in their decisions. The Study 
aims to contribute to our growing understanding of how international 
law articulates with domestic law. 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as 
well as the innumerable treatises that address sources of international 
law, emphasize treaties, custom, and general principles as primary 
sources of international law. Yet among these, treaties are likely to be 
preferred by domestic judges. For domestic judges not necessarily 
trained in international law, treaties are more readily accessible and 

1. Reem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of 
International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555, 555 (2002-2003). 
See generally David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis, 
in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1-
60 (David Sloss ed., 2009); OXFORD REPORTS ON INT'L LAW, OXFORD REPORTS ON INT’L 
LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS (2014); ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (2011). 
2. Paul F. Diehl, Charlotte Ku & Daniel Zamora, The Dynamics of International Law: 
The Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems, 57 INT’L ORG. 43, 50 (2003). 
3. See generally NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE (2002); 
NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 1; Bahdi, supra note 1; INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC 
LEGAL SYSTEMS: INCORPORATION, TRANSFORMATION AND PERSUASION (Dinah Shelton ed., 
2011); THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY, supra note 1; Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty 
Enforcement: Summary and Conclusions, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY 
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 1, at 555; Melissa A. Waters, Creeping 
Monism: The Judicial Trend toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 
COLUM. L. REV 628 (2007). 
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more easily recognizable as law, than are custom and general 
principles. The baseline expectation is therefore that domestic judges 
will refer more frequently to treaties than to other sources of 
international law. A second proposition is that judges will invoke 
other kinds of international legal materials—customary international 
law, the decisions of international courts, and various “soft law” 
materials—to aid them in interpreting and applying treaty norms. One 
implication is that there should be a “clustering” of international law 
references, as decisions that cite one kind of international legal 
material are likely to cite other kinds as well. 
The first Sections of the Essay develop the arguments and lead 
up to the two main propositions. I argue that three factors lead 
domestic courts to cite international law: the internationalization of 
human rights law, the expansion of rights review in domestic courts, 
and underlying incentives of judges. The data show that the largest 
share of decisions citing international legal materials occur in cases 
involving disputes about rights. They also show that domestic courts 
cite treaties more often than the other types of international legal 
materials—with some intriguing exceptions, but that courts are 
surprisingly willing to cite the decisions of international courts, 
customary international law, and soft law. The analysis also reveals 
that the various types of international legal materials tend to “cluster” 
—a decision that cites one type is likely to cite at least one other.  The 
findings suggest that we should look more closely at how domestic 
courts make use of the full range of international legal materials, not 
just treaties.  
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 
A growing body of research in recent years has documented and 
assessed the phenomenon of “international law in domestic courts.”  
One striking theme of this work is that courts from every major legal 
tradition and from every part of the world draw on international legal 
norms in deciding domestic disputes. For instance, the Oxford 
electronic database “International Law in Domestic Courts” includes 
more than 1300 decisions from ninety countries, covering all regions 
of the world.4 Each decision in the database includes at least one 
reference to international law. The set of cases in the database is not a 
systematic sample, but the number and diversity of countries included 

4. OXFORD REPORTS ON INT'L LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS, supra note 1.  
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are noteworthy. Other studies have focused on the ways in which 
domestic courts apply or otherwise make use of international law, 
again covering a striking variety of legal systems.5 
With respect to treaty law, the central involvement of courts is 
not surprising. In most countries, “it has been left up to the courts . . . 
to identify treaties and determine the rules by which to interpret 
them.”6 Waters offers a typology of principles or doctrines by which 
domestic courts bring international law to bear on questions of 
domestic law.7 One such important mode is the “presumption of 
conformity,”8 the principle that domestic statutes—and sometimes 
constitutions—should be interpreted as far as possible in a way that is 
consistent with treaty commitments.9 
 National courts also invoke treaties and other international 
legal materials as guides, or aids, in the interpretation of domestic 
laws; they refer to international legal norms not because they are 
binding but because they are useful.10 This mode of interpretation fits 
with what Bahdi views as “reliance on international law to help 
uncover values inherent within the domestic regime.”11 Courts in the 
Netherlands,12 Australia,13 and Canada14 have employed this 

5. See, e.g., JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 3; NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 1; Bahdi, supra 
note 1; INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3; Sloss, supra 
note 1; Waters, supra note 3. 
6. Dinah Shelton, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS: INCORPORATION, TRANSFORMATION AND PERSUASION, supra note 3, at 10. 
7. See Waters, supra note 3. 
8. See JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 3, at 246–47; NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 1, at 145–
46, 148, 153; Hans-Peter Folz, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, supra note 3 at 240, 245; Van Alstine, supra note 3, at 593–94; Erika de Wet, South 
Africa, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 567, 587. 
See generally OXFORD REPORTS ON INT’L LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS, supra note 1; 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3. 
9.  This principle is familiar in the US jurisprudence as the “Charming Betsy” canon. See 
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
10. H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263 (1987); Yuval 
Shany, How Supreme Is the Supreme Law of the Land? A Comparative Analysis of the 
Influence of International Human Rights Conventions Upon the Interpretation of 
Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 341, 343 (2006); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 124–25 
(1994). 
11. Bahdi, supra note 1, at 556–57; see also Van Alstine, supra note 3, at 608–12. 
12. See Evert A. Alkema, Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 407, 423. 
13. See Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
14. See Stéphane Beaulac & John H. Currie, Canada, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 116, 134, 145–47. 
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approach.  In some countries, courts invoke as persuasive authority 
treaties to which the state is not yet a party, including Venezuela,15 
Austria,16 the Netherlands,17 Nigeria,18 and Poland.19   
 In some instances, national courts rely on international treaties 
as an aid in the interpretation of constitutional rights.20 In 1989, in 
Slaight Communications v. Davidson, the Supreme Court of Canada, 
invoking the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), declared that it could refer to 
international law, both treaty and custom, to determine the substance 
of constitutional rights.21 The Supreme Court of India, in Vishaka v. 
State of Rajasthan, stated that it had “no hesitation in placing reliance 
on [international commitments] for the purpose of construing the 
nature and ambit of the constitutional guarantee of gender equality in 
our Constitution.”22 In Bangladesh, treaty law can “be used to 
interpret fundamental rights in the constitution and to develop 
common law on the matter.”23 Fundamental rights expressed in the 
German Grundgesetz must be interpreted in conformity with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) if possible, and 
the ECHR and decisions of the ECHR are used to interpret rights 
established in the Basic Law.24 Courts in Nigeria, Poland, South 
Africa, and Venezuela have engaged in similar practices.25 A recent 
comparative study found that courts in countries from both monist 
(South Africa, Germany, and Poland) and dualist (India) traditions 
have been guided by international human rights law in constitutional 
interpretation.26  

15. See Eugenio Hernández-Bretón, Venezuela, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC 
LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 660, 660–64. 
16. See Elisabeth Handl-Petz, Austria, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 55, 85. 
17. See Alkema, supra note 12, at 427. 
18. See Babafemi Akrinrinade, Nigeria, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 448, 460. 
19. See Anna Wyrozumska, Poland, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 468, 478, 494. 
20. See, e.g., Bahdi, supra note 1, at 586. 
21. Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (Can.). 
22. Vishaka v. The State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 para. ¶13 (India). 
23. Bianca Karim & Tirza Theunissen, Bangladesh, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 98, 110. 
24. See Folz, supra note 8, at 246-48. 
25. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3. 
26. See Van Alstine, supra note 3, at 595–97. 
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A. The Arguments 
The focus in this Study is on the normative structures that 
connect international law to domestic legal systems and on the 
motivations of domestic judges. The discussion focuses on human 
rights because human rights cases have accounted for the largest share 
of citations to international legal materials in the set of decisions 
analyzed here as noted in Figure 1.27 In fact, in the dataset, 114 
decisions that cited international law involved disputes over rights. 
The second most common legal domain, with seventeen cases, was 
“International” (cases involving international law issues) and the third 
was “Institutional” (involving relations between branches or levels of 
government), with sixteen. 
For the three national courts examined here, human rights 
litigation is driving the greatest share of citations to international legal 
materials in domestic courts. The central argument is that 
interconnections between domestic and international human rights 
law make it possible—even likely—that domestic judges will cite 
international legal materials in the human rights domain.  Because 
domestic rights law is increasingly grounded in international human 
rights norms, judges in many jurisdictions quite naturally turn to 
international law in order to interpret and apply domestic rights 
protections. The following sub-sections assess the interconnected 
structures of domestic and international human rights law, the 
motivations and reasons for judges to invoke international norms, and 
what these arguments imply for the types of international legal 
materials that judges are likely to cite. 

27. See infra fig.1. 
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B. The Internationalization of Human Rights Law 
 Domestic constitutional rights and international human rights 
are parallel but increasingly interlinked norm structures. The “twin 
systems” of domestic constitutional rights and international human 
rights emerged after World War II and the “the rights contained in the 
major international human rights treaties are very broadly similar in 
substance to the rights contained in most modern constitutions.”28 The 

28. Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights and International Constitutionalism, in RULING 
THE WORLD? CONSTITITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
233, 235 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). 
Figure 1 
0
25
50
75
10
0
12
5
15
0
Rights
International
Institutional
Business
Torts
Property
Contract
Admin law
Number of decisions w/ int’l cites,
by legal domain, all 3 countries
602 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:595 
development of the international human rights regime is by now a 
well-known story,29 as is the expansion of rights protections in 
national constitutions.30 Every national constitution of the 106 created 
since 1985 included a charter of rights.31   
 The expansion of constitutional rights has been visible not just 
in the number of constitutions containing them but in the number of 
rights covered. In 1946, the typical constitution included nineteen of 
fifty-six substantive rights as tracked by Law and Versteeg in The 
Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism; by 2006 that 
average had risen to thirty-three of fifty-six rights. Equally striking, 
“most constitutions are indeed gaining additional rights over time, 
regardless of whether they are starting from a relatively high or low 
baseline.”32 Law and Versteeg note that the “phenomenon of rights 
creep at the level of domestic constitutional law parallels the striking 
growth in the volume and scope of international human rights 
instruments over the same time period, which warrants suspicion that 
the two developments may be interrelated, if not symbiotic.”33 Indeed, 
if constitutions arose strictly out of the specific contexts and 
characteristics of national histories, cultures, social forces, and 
politics, we would observe a diversity of constitutional forms.  
Instead, we observe striking convergence, which implies international 
or transnational shaping of domestic constitutions.   
 Countries do appear to emulate or borrow from the 
constitutions of countries with which they have important ties.  
Goderis and Versteeg find that “the rights-related content of a 
country’s constitution is indeed shaped by the constitutional choices 
of other countries, in particular the former colonizer, countries with 
the same legal origin, the same dominant religion, the same former 

29. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2013); DAVID P. 
FORSYTHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1991). 
30. See, e.g., HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH 
AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (2000); Philip Alston, A Framework for the 
Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights, in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF 
RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1 (1999); John Boli, Human Rights or State 
Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of Constitutional Rights, 1870-1970, in 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 133 (George Thomas, John Meyer, Francsico Ramirez & John 
Boli eds., 1987).  
31. Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
816, 816 n.2 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
32. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1197 (2011). 
33. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added). 
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colonizer, and the same dominant aid donor.”34 But what is most 
striking is the degree of global convergence, even given the different 
modes of transnational diffusion. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons 
track the establishment of specific human rights in international 
treaties and their appearance in national constitutions. They show that 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) in 
particular “have played crucial roles in the spread of formal human 
rights into national constitutions.”35   
 Even common law countries that have constitutionalized 
fundamental rights have done so within a framework structured by 
international human rights. The 1998 Human Rights Act in the United 
Kingdom was a measure to incorporate the European Convention on 
Human Rights into British law. Canada’s 1982 Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms does not explicitly ground 
Canadian rights in international rights, but Canadian courts have 
“liberally taken account of international human rights obligations 
when construing the fundamental guarantees set out in the Charter.”36 
Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence has established that the 
Charter should be interpreted in light of international human rights 
law. In Slaight, the Court declared that, “the Charter should generally 
be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by 
similar provisions in international human rights documents which 
Canada has ratified.”37  
In addition to incorporating substantive rights enumerated in 
treaties, a striking number of national constitutions refer to human 
rights treaties as points of reference or even mention specific treaties.  
As of 2006, forty-six constitutions referenced human rights treaties by 
name, often incorporating them into domestic law, sometimes with 
supra-statutory status.38 
 
 

34. Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, Transnational Constitutions (unpublished work) 
(Apr. 1, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216582. 
35. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth A. Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty 
Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
61, 63 (2013). 
36. Beaulac & Currie, supra note 14, at 151. 
37. Slaight Communications, Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056 (Can.). 
38. See infra tbl. 1. 
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Table 1:  Treaties named in national constitutions 
Country Constitution year Treaties named 
Afghanistan 2004 UDHR 
Albania 1998 ECHR 
Andorra 1993 UDHR 
Angola 1975 UDHR, ACHPR 
Argentina 1983 
UDHR, Genocide, CERD, ICCPR, 
ICESCR, ACHR, CEDAW, CRC 
Benin 1990 UDHR, ACHPR 
Bolivia 1967 UDHR 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
1995 UDHR, Genocide, Geneva, Refugee, 
ECHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, European Torture 
Convention, CEDAW, CAT, ICMW, CRC 
Burkina Faso  1991 UDHR, ACHPR 
Burundi 2004 
UDHR, ICCPR, CEDAW, CRC, 
ACHPR 
Cambodia  1993 UDHR, CEDAW, CRC 
Cameroon 1972 UDHR, ACHPR 
Cape Verde 1980 UDHR 
Central African 
Republic 2004 UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, ACHPR 
Chad 1996 UDHR, ACHPR 
Congo, 
Democratic Republic of 2005 UDHR, CEDAW, CRC, ACHPR 
Cote D'Ivoire 2000 UDHR, ACHPR 
Czech Republic 1993 ECHR 
East Timor 2002 UDHR 
Equatorial 
Guinea 1991 UDHR 
Ethiopia 1994 UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR 
Gabon 1991 UDHR, ACHPR 
Germany 1949 ECHR 
Guinea 1990 UDHR, ACHPR 
Haiti 1987 UDHR 
Lebanon 1926 UDHR 
Luxembourg 2000 Rome Statute of the ICC 
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Table 1:  Treaties named in national constitutions 
Country Constitution year Treaties named 
Madagascar 1998 UDHR, CEDAW, CRC, ACHPR 
Mali 1992 UDHR, ACHPR 
Mauritania 1991 UDHR, ACHPR 
Moldova 1994 UDHR 
Mozambique 2004 UDHR, ACHPR 
Nicaragua 1987 UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, ACHR 
Niger 1999 UDHR, ACHPR 
Peru 1993 UDHR 
Portugal 1976, 2002 UDHR, Rome Statute of the ICC 
Romania 1991 UDHR 
Rwanda 2003 
UDHR, Genocide, CERD, ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC, ACHPR 
Sao Tome And 
Principe 1975 UDHR 
Spain 1978 UDHR 
Sweden 1974 ECHR 
Tanzania 1985 UDHR 
Togo 1992 UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, ACHPR 
Venezuela 1999 ICCPR, ACHR, CRC 
Yemen  1991 UDHR 
Source:  Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton (2010) 
Note:  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty but is included in the list 
because it is almost universally recognized as expressing customary international law. 
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Figure 2 presents a global view of the cumulative number of 
references to specific international human rights documents.39 The 
rise in such references is especially striking after 1989. 
 
Finally, both international and constitutional rights law now 
have a “suprapositive” character, in the sense that they are not based 
only on consensual, positive foundations.40 As Neuman puts it, 
fundamental legal rights are widely seen as having “normative force 
independent of their embodiment in law, or even superior to the 
positive legal system (hence the adjective ‘suprapositive’).”41 The 
“pervasiveness and prominence of the suprapositive aspect in human 

39. Author’s calculations based on data from Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton (2010). 
40. See Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and 
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1868 (2003). 
41. Id. 
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rights law affects the international law and politics of the field” and 
distinguishes, even if not absolutely, international human rights law 
from other areas of international law.42 Among suprapositive human 
rights norms, a sub-category of rights has even more privileged status 
in both international and domestic constitutional rights systems.  
These are rights that are categorical, permitting no exceptions or 
derogations.43 In international law, these are peremptory or jus cogens 
norms, including the prohibitions on slavery, genocide, and torture.   
The interconnectedness of domestic and international human 
rights law, and their shared suprapositive status, explain in part why 
domestic courts are a crucial site for the application of international 
human rights norms. Hathaway notes that “domestic legal 
enforcement” of human rights treaty obligations is “at least as 
important as international enforcement.”44 Simmons contends that 
domestic courts are one of two primary mechanisms for inducing 
states to comply with their human rights treaty commitments.45 
Indeed, as Nollkaemper has argued, international law has “become 
. . . dependent” on national courts for the adjudication of human rights 
claims.46 Though international human rights systems—especially the 
European Court of Human Rights—have developed strikingly in 
recent decades, they are still a second or, more likely, a last resort 
after national courts. Only a small fraction of all rights claims being 
litigated in the world will ever be heard or decided in an international 
venue. Scholarship on international human rights law suggests, then, 
that domestic courts are the primary forum for human rights 
enforcement.  
The crucial point is that, because domestic and international 
rights norms share a common suprapositive status, it can be relatively 
natural or straightforward for domestic judges to refer to international 
human rights law in determining the content and meaning of those 
norms. This argument on the interconnectedness of domestic and 
international human rights law, then, explains why human rights cases 
are driving citations to international legal materials. In few, if any, 
other areas of law do domestic and international law share substantive 

42. Id. at 1869. 
43. See Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 236. 
44. Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties, 51 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 593 (2007). 
45. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS, 112–55 (2009). 
46. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 1, at 34. 
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rules and normative foundations to the degree that they do in human 
rights.  If this is the case, then the interconnectedness of domestic and 
international human rights law will be recognized in dualist as well as 
monist countries, in civil law as well as common law systems.   
II. WHY DOMESTIC JUDGES CITE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 The task of this Part is to establish the reasons or motivations 
for which domestic judges invoke international law. The previous Part 
explained the broad normative-structural context that permits, and 
even promotes, citations to international law. This Part explores two 
factors that lead judges to cite international law, one institutional and 
one individual:  (1) the expansion of judicial constitutional review, 
and (2) the incentives of judges. 
A. The Expansion of Rights Review 
 The idea that judges should pass judgment on the 
constitutionality—and given the centrality of rights in modern 
constitutions, the rights-compatibility—of the acts and policies of 
government has spread through much of the world. That expansion is 
partly a matter of formal institutional (“de jure”) arrangements, and 
partly a function of judicial culture or attitudes, that is, how judges 
define their mission and their role vis-à-vis the political branches of 
government.47 The proliferation of substantive human rights was 
accompanied by the spread of judicial review in national 
constitutions. 
The expansion of constitutional review has been global.48 In Law 
and Versteeg’s analysis, the diffusion of judicial review has been 
“even more dramatic” than the spread of constitutional rights. Only 
25% of constitutions explicitly included judicial review in 1946; 82% 
did so in 2006.49 But the exercise of judicial review does not depend 
exclusively on de jure authority. Courts sometimes carve out that 

47. See generally LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND 
DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE (2007); DIANA KAPISZEWSKI, HIGH COURTS AND 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (2012); Ezequiel González Ocantos, 
Persuade Them or Oust Them: Crafting Judicial Change and Transitional Justice in 
Argentina, 46 J. COMP. POL. 479, 479–98 (2014); Lisa Hilbink, The Origins of Positive 
Judicial Independence, 64 WORLD POL. 587 (2012). 
48. Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?, 
30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2015). 
49. Law & Versteeg, supra note 32, at 1199. 
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authority for themselves, as the US Supreme Court famously did in 
Marbury v. Madison. France’s Conseil constitutionnel transformed 
itself in the 1980s from a “passive, even docile body to an assertive 
and powerful policymaker” that placed all French legislation under 
the shadow of judicial review, in the absence of any change in the 
Conseil’s formal constitutional competences.50 Other countries in 
which courts exercise judicial review without a constitutional 
provision for it include Australia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Israel, 
Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and Tonga.51 Including both de facto 
and de jure judicial review, 35% of countries had it in 1946 whereas 
87% did in 2006.52 
One fundamental purpose of judicial review was to ensure that 
government acts did not encroach on legally protected rights. In Stone 
Sweet’s account, the new constitutionalism after World War II, 
partially described above, included three essential features:  “(1) an 
entrenched, written constitution, (2) a charter of fundamental rights, 
and (3) a mode of constitutional judicial review to protect those 
rights.”53 Germany and Italy adopted this constitutional court model; 
Spain followed them as it democratized in the 1970s. The new 
constitutionalism informed subsequent rounds of democratization in 
Central and Eastern Europe and South Africa, and “made in-roads” 
even in regions strongly influenced by the United States, like Asia 
and Latin America. Of the 106 national constitutions created since 
1985, all but five provided for rights review. The new model 
originated in Europe but it had spread globally by the 1990s.54 In 
other words, across much of the world, judges have either acquired 
the constitutional authority to conduct rights review or have 
developed that authority through jurisprudence. I argue that when 
judges are in a position to carry out rights review, judicial norms, or 
the judges’ own interests, or both, can motivate them to consult 
international law.  

50. ALEC STONE SWEET, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16 (1992). 
51. Law & Versteeg, supra note 32, at 1199 n.127. 
52. Id. at 1199. 
53.  Sweet, supra note 31, at 816 (emphasis added). 
54. See id. at 817–20. 
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B. Judges’ Motivations and Interests 
In exercising rights review, judges are typically asked to rule on 
the compatibility of government acts with legally protected rights.  In 
some countries, courts that engage in rights review are legally 
authorized to look to international law for guidance. In some 
countries, the constitution urges or requires judges to consider 
international law. Perhaps most famously, the Constitution of South 
Africa requires courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to 
“consider international law.”55 Under reforms that took effect in 
November 2012, Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution declares that 
“all persons shall enjoy the human rights recognized in this 
Constitution and in international treaties to which Mexico is a 
party.”56 Article 1 goes on to require that norms concerning human 
rights always be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution and 
with international treaties in the manner that offers the broadest 
protection. In South Africa and Mexico, in other words, judges are 
obligated to interpret rights in light of international law. 
Similarly, where treaties have direct effect—are automatically 
incorporated in domestic law, or are self-executing—judges are likely 
to invoke them as they would any other relevant law. This mechanism 
operates in monist countries; in dualist countries treaties typically 
require legislative action to be incorporated into domestic law. In the 
latter context, judges will frequently refer to the relevant treaties in 
order to interpret and apply the implementing legislation. 
In addition to the domestic legal-structural conditions that might 
push judges toward citing international law, the expansion of rights 
review combined with constitutional or doctrinal principles, judges 
have some internal motivations for drawing on international legal 
materials.  Because decisions that overrule government acts are likely 
to spur tension, if not conflict, with other branches of government 
whose acts are being examined, domestic judges who are in a position 
to conduct rights review will take advantage of any resource that 
might support and legitimize those decisions. International human 
rights law, as a complex of suprapositive norms connected to 
domestic rights law, is particularly well suited to perform that 

55. S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1)(b), 1996.  
56. Consitutción Políta de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Political Constituion of the 
United Mexican States) [C.P.], as amended, art. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 30 de 
Noviembre de 2012, (author translation). 
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function. I suggest that this will be true regardless of the underlying 
theory of judicial behavior that one might prefer.  
The three main strands of theory on judicial decision-making are 
the legal, the attitudinal (ideological), and the strategic. The legal 
model is the traditional account of judging in which judges seek to 
resolve disputes according to the written law and case law. If judges 
decide as this theory suggests, then international law is a valid and 
relevant source of legal norms and principles, the more so as it is 
interconnected with domestic rights law. Judges operating in the 
“legal decision-making” mode will cite international legal materials 
because they contain relevant law and interpretive guidelines. The 
attitudinal model contends that judges decide according to their 
political or ideological preferences.57 In this model, judges will cite 
international law to reinforce decisions that they have made on 
underlying ideological grounds. The strategic model holds that judges 
add to the attitudinal approach the constraints imposed on them by 
other institutional actors, including other courts, the executive, the 
legislature, and public opinion.58 Judges acting strategically will cite 
international legal materials to bolster their decisions against 
resistance or backlash from other actors. The higher the status of 
international law in the domestic legal system, the greater the value of 
citing international law in domestic judicial decisions.  The status of 
international law is higher to the extent that: (1) ratified treaties are 
automatically incorporated in domestic law, (2) treaties are 
incorporated into domestic law by legislative action, (3) treaties—or 
custom—are equal in status or superior to ordinary law in the 
domestic legal order, and (4) the constitution explicitly confers 
domestic legal status on human rights treaties in general or on specific 
treaties.   
Where treaties are directly incorporated into domestic law and 
are superior or equal to statute, judges can cite them as binding law.  
That situation, however, is probably rare. More likely, in any of the 
three judicial decision-making modes, domestic judges cite 
international law as “persuasive authority,” which “attracts adherence 

57. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002). 
58. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 139–62 (1998). 
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as opposed to obliging it.”59 The idea is that where the extent or 
application of domestic rights is unclear (as it by nature often will be), 
judges can turn to non-domestic legal materials that might aid in 
interpreting domestic rights provisions. Given the suprapositive 
nature of international human rights law, and its dense 
interconnections with domestic human rights law, international law 
can be a useful source of ideas and guidance to judges wrestling with 
the interpretation of domestic rights. And international legal norms 
offer courts a persuasive resource that they are uniquely positioned to 
utilize. This will be true whether judges are trying to apply law and 
precedent, seeking to implement their policy preferences, acting 
strategically vis-à-vis executives and legislatures, or all three. 
C. How Domestic Judges Make Use of International Legal Materials 
 If national judges follow international law norms regarding 
sources of law, they will be more likely to invoke treaties than other 
sources of international law, and they will tend to invoke subsidiary 
sources of international law as aids to understanding and interpreting 
the content of treaty rules. 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice offers the 
canonical statement on the sources of international law.  Article 38 
identifies three primary sources—treaties, customary law, and general 
principles of law—and two “subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law.”60  Of the three primary sources of international law, 
treaties are by far the easiest for domestic judges—as well as other 
legal actors—to recognize. Domestic actors recognize treaty law 
because domestic laws universally do so. At a minimum, constitutions 
define a process by which the government can enter into treaty 
obligations; treaties that come into force for a country via the 
stipulated process express legal rules. For instance, the US 
Constitution specifies the process by which the United States enters 
into treaties61 and further stipulates that, “all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land.”62 It is a simple matter, then, for US courts 

59. Patrick Glenn, supra note 10, at 263. Glenn discusses persuasive authority in the 
context of citations to foreign courts, but the idea is the same with respect to citing 
international legal materials. See id.; see also Slaughter, supra note 10, at 124. 
60. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para 1. 
61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
62. Id. art. VI. 
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to recognize treaty law that applies to the United States—though a 
much less simple matter to determine how treaties should be applied 
in domestic courts.   
The key point is that national—usually constitutional—law 
provides rules by which domestic courts—as well as legislatures and 
executives—can recognize treaty law as embodying legal norms. 
With respect to the other primary sources of international law—
customary international law and general principles—recognition of 
international legal rules by national courts is almost always more 
complicated. Determining the content of customary international law 
(“CIL”) is fraught with challenges, even for international law 
scholars,63 and some international law scholars question the 
contemporary relevance of CIL altogether.64 “General principles of 
law” are even more difficult to pin down. Thus, as one prominent 
textbook puts it, “it is not easy to isolate the emergence of a new rule 
of customary law and there are immense problems involved in 
collating all the necessary information.”65 And regarding general 
principles, they are “of fairly limited scope.”66 In short, domestic 
courts are almost certain to have more difficulty in deploying 
customary international law and general principles than they do in 
invoking treaty law.   
The “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” are 
not sources of international law in themselves but can be used to 
interpret international legal norms. The subsidiary means include 
judicial decisions.67 The decisions of international courts and tribunals 
offer authoritative interpretations of international legal rules.  
Domestic courts can therefore recognize international court decisions 
as relevant guides for specifying the content and meaning of 
international legal norms.  
A variety of additional texts and documents, though not 
embodying legal obligations, can serve as aids to interpretation of 
international legal norms. I group these materials under the rubric 
“soft law.” For example, resolutions and declarations of the UN 
General Assembly are not legally binding but courts and other legal 

63. See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES (1999); 
ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). 
64. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005). 
65. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (5th ed. 2003). 
66. Id. at 93–94. 
67. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. 
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actors sometimes consult them as evidence of the general opinion or 
understanding of the community of states regarding international 
norms. The International Law Commission (“ILC”) is a body created 
by the General Assembly for the “promotion of the progressive 
development of international law and its codification.”68 The ILC’s 
studies and draft statutes are widely seen as distilling current 
understandings of international law. Similarly, a variety of human 
rights treaty bodies produce reports and findings that are generally 
seen as reliable interpretations of the relevant treaties. For instance, 
the Committee against Torture is regarded as an authoritative guide—
through its “General Comments”—with respect to the Convention 
against Torture.  
 Finally, international law itself offers principles for the 
interpretation of treaties, and these principles are frequently integrated 
into domestic legal systems. The principles have been codified in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).69 The first 
principle is that a treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning” of its text, “in the light of its 
object and purpose.”70 The norm that laws should be interpreted 
according to the meaning of their text is fundamental in most legal 
systems. The VCLT principles also include any subsequent agreement 
of the parties regarding interpretation of the treaty, subsequent 
practice by the states parties, and “[a]ny relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.”71  
“Supplementary means of interpretation” include the “preparatory 
work of the treaty” but are otherwise left quite open-ended.72   
Courts in many countries rely on the VCLT to resolve questions 
involving the status or interpretation of treaties.73 This is the practice 
in Australia when the treaty has been incorporated through 
legislation.74 Czech courts must apply the VCLT in interpreting 

68. Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 1, para. 1, G.A. Res. 174 (II), 
(Nov. 21, 1947) [hereinafter ILC]. 
69. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
70. Id. art. 31, para. 1. 
71. Id. art. 31 para. 3(c). 
72. Id. art. 32.  
73. Shelton, supra note 6, at 10. 
74. Alice de Jonge, Australia, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, supra note 3 at 23, 40. 
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treaties; the Convention is part of Czech law.75 Courts in Austria, 
Canada, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, Poland, and Venezuela—even 
though it is not a state party—refer to the VCLT.76 In the United 
Kingdom, which has not incorporated the VCLT into domestic law, 
courts interpret treaties that have been incorporated by “scheduling” 
—appending the text to a piece of legislation—according to 
international law rules of interpretation as codified in the VCLT.77 
Even where domestic judges might not be acquainted with the VCLT, 
judges are still likely to analyze, first, the text of a treaty, followed by 
related agreements and laws, and finally by the preparatory work and 
other supplementary aids to interpretation. Waters argues, and 
provides evidence that, domestic courts tend to look first to treaty 
law, and that treaties then “bridge” to other kinds of legal materials—
judicial decisions and soft law—that can be helpful in interpreting 
treaties.78   
 III. THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS LEAD TO TWO 
PROPOSITIONS 
Proposition 1: National judges will cite treaties more often than 
they cite international judicial decisions, soft law, or customary 
international law.  
Proposition 2: Citations to international courts and soft law are 
more likely to occur when courts cite treaties than when they do not 
cite treaties.  
A. Proposition 1: National Judges Will Cite Treaties More Often 
Than They Cite International Judicial Decisions, Soft Law, or 
Customary International Law  
The first proposition is that national courts will cite treaties more 
often than they refer to other types of international legal material.  
Proving this contention would require comprehensive data on 
references to international law from a large sample of national 
jurisdictions. Those data do not yet exist. But initial data from the 

75. Alexander J. BČlohlávek, The Czech Repulic, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3 at 195, 199–200. 
76. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 10. 
77. Anthony Aust, United Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 476, 483. 
78. See Waters, supra note 3, at 666–68. 
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Courts and the Globalization of Law Project provide suggestive 
evidence from three countries: Australia, Canada, and South Africa.  
The Courts and the Globalization of Law Project (“CGLP”) codes 
decisions from the top courts of a set of countries from all regions of 
the world. “Top courts” are those with constitutional jurisdiction, 
where such jurisdiction is formally established, or the highest general 
court of appeal. The three courts included in this study are the High 
Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa. In addition to coding basic 
information about the case—subject matter and outcomes, for 
example—the database records every citation to foreign or 
international legal materials. Every decision from odd-numbered 
years from 1991 through 2011 is included. For South Africa, coverage 
begins in 1995, the year the Constitutional Court came into being. 
The database excludes brief orders relating to motions or other 
procedural questions. As of this writing, the database includes 
approximately 1600 decisions and about 30,000 individual citations. 
 Though none of the three courts is from a civil law 
jurisdiction, they do offer important sources of variation. Two of the 
countries have traditional common law traditions—Australia and 
Canada—and third, South Africa, has a mixed system—British 
common law and Dutch-Roman law. The three courts vary quite 
significantly in the nature of their jurisdiction in cases involving 
rights review. The High Court of Australia’s (“HCA”) basic 
jurisdiction does not explicitly include constitutional review, though 
Parliament can enact laws granting it jurisdiction in matters “[a]rising 
under this Constitution, or involving its interpretation.”79 The HCA 
decides appeals regarding the rights of Australians, though Australia 
does not have a formal bill of rights. The Supreme Court of Canada 
(“SCC”) resolves constitutional questions, including those arising 
under the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.80  “Anyone 
whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been 
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction,”81 
and the Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal in any such 
cases. The Constitutional Court of South Africa (“CCSA”) has 
jurisdiction only on constitutional matters and the South African 

79. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION ch. III § 76. 
80. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), 
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 44, Pt. I (Can.) 
81. Id. § 24(1).  
2015] HOW DOMESTIC COURTS USE INTERNATIONAL LAW 617 
Constitution does include a bill of rights. The CCSA is the highest 
court on constitutional issues and can also exercise original 
jurisdiction on direct applications. The court itself determines whether 
cases raise important questions of constitutional interpretation.  
 Because the three courts analyzed here engage in rights 
review, and because two of them operate under rules or principles that 
encourage them to consider international human rights law, if the 
propositions are not confirmed for this set of courts, they are unlikely 
to be applicable in other courts. The three courts are, in other words, 
most likely cases, which are well suited for a plausibility probe of the 
arguments. By the same token, if the propositions are confirmed for 
these courts, then additional testing with a broader set of courts is 
clearly warranted. 
The differences among the three courts lead to some initial 
expectations about their propensity to invoke international legal 
materials. The CCSA’s jurisdiction is limited to cases that raise 
constitutional questions. Because a large share of such cases involve 
rights, and—for reasons discussed above—rights cases are probably 
more likely to produce references to international law, we might 
expect a higher share of CCSA decisions to cite international legal 
materials. In addition, international law is more institutionalized in 
the CCSA than it is in the other two courts. The South African 
Constitutional Court, “when interpreting the Bill of Rights . . . must 
consider international law,”82 and the Court employs a law clerk 
specifically to research foreign and international law. The SCC is not 
required by law to consult international law while engaging in rights 
review, but it has developed doctrine by which Charter rights should 
be interpreted with reference to rights embodied in international 
instruments. The High Court of Australia is under no legal strictures 
one way or the other with respect to consulting international law. In 
sum, the Constitutional Court of South Africa should cite 
international law more frequently than the other two courts. The SCC 
might more frequently cite international law than the HCA given its 
jurisprudence on international law and rights interpretation. In fact, 
the top courts in Australia, Canada, and South Africa display different 
propensities to invoke international materials, as shown in Figure 2.83   

82. S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1), 1996. 
83. See supra fig.2. 
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The Canadian Supreme Court is fairly consistent in referring to 
international legal materials in about 10% of its decisions. The High 
Court of Australia cites international legal materials in 20% of its 
decisions during the period 1997 to 2009, but in 10% or less of its 
decisions outside that timeframe. Australia’s high level of citations to 
international legal materials may appear puzzling because it is not 
under a constitutional mandate (South Africa) nor jurisprudential 
principles (Canada) supporting reference to international law. It is 
worth, at this point, keeping in mind that the propensity of a court to 
invoke international legal materials depends in part on the specific 
judges on the court. Some judges’ personal judicial philosophies or 
experiences lead them to be more open to transnational or 
international judicial dialogue.84 Judge Michael Kirby of the High 
Court of Australia was certainly one such judge. Judge Kirby was an 
active participant in the Interights conferences that produced the 
Bangalore Principles. The Bangalore Principles declare that human 
rights are grounded in international human rights codes and that 
national judges have a duty to interpret domestic constitutions and 
legislation in harmony with international human rights law.85 Judge 
Kirby became an active and outspoken advocate of the Bangalore 
Principles.86 Judge Kirby sat on the High Court of Australia from 
1996 to 2009, a span that coincides precisely with the years in which 
the share of the Court’s decisions citing international law was high—
the 1997–2009 period in Figure 3. Not coincidentally, Judge Kirby, 
by a considerable margin, cited international law more frequently than 
any other judge on the court during the 1991–2011 period, as shown 
in Figure 4.87 The graph displays the average number of citations to 
international legal materials per year, as well as the years each judge 
sat on the High Court. Similar graphs for the SCC and the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa are available in the Appendix. In 
neither of the other two courts is the gap between the judge with the 
highest average citations to international law and the next judges as 
great as it is in the HCA. In addition, the highest average for a judge 
in the SCC—La Forest, nineteen—and for a judge in the CCSA—
Chaskalson, twenty-one—is much smaller than Judge Kirby’s average 
of fifty-eight.  
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84. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (1999). 
85. See Waters, supra note 3, at 646–47. 
86. See generally MICHAEL D. KIRBY, THROUGH THE WORLD’S EYE (2000). 
87. See infra fig.4.  
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 The Constitutional Court of South Africa cited international 
materials at an exceptionally high rate in its first few years, followed 
by wide fluctuation and then a leveling out at over 20% of decisions. 
The high early rate may well be attributable to the lack of useable 
domestic rights-related case law in South Africa in the Court’s early 
years, leading the Court to rely initially on international and foreign 
sources. As the Court developed its own jurisprudence, its reliance on 
international law would naturally decline—though to a level that is 
still high by comparative standards.  
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In terms of subject matter, for all three courts, the largest number 
of decisions and the largest number of decisions invoking 
international law involve questions of rights, as depicted in Figure 5.88  
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88. See infra fig.5.  
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As to whether courts cite treaties more often than they cite other 
international legal materials, Figure 6 indicates that they do.89 The 
graphs include only decisions that made some reference to 
international law and report the percentage of decisions invoking 
specific types of international legal materials. For Australia, treaties 
were the most commonly cited international material in every year.  
The percentage of decisions invoking treaties was never lower than 
60% and it reached 100% in four of the eleven years for which we 
have data. The picture is slightly more complex for Canada and South 
Africa. In Canada’s Supreme Court, treaties were the most commonly 
cited international legal material in eight of the eleven years—tied in 
one. Treaties were cited in all of the decisions that made reference to 
international law in 2007, 2009, and 2011. Treaties were the most 
commonly cited international material in six of nine years in the 
South African Constitutional Court, tied with other categories in four 
of the six years.   
Of the three courts, the CCSA is the one most likely to cite 
international legal materials other than treaties and to cite 
international courts. In 2003, for instance, every decision that cited 
international legal materials made reference to an international court.  
An initial speculation might be that the CCSA cites international 
courts more frequently because South Africa, unlike Australia and 
Canada, belongs to a regional human rights system, comprised of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and, since 2006, 
the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACtHPR”). 
However, in the database analyzed here, none of the CCSA’s citations 
to international courts was to the African Commission or the 
ACtHPR. The most frequently cited international court was the 
European Court of Human Rights—112 citations—and the second 
was the International Court of Justice—14 citations.   

89. See infra fig.6.  
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 A second way to test the proposition that courts are more 
likely to cite treaties than other types of international legal materials 
is to assess decisions that invoke only one type. If the proposition is 
correct, the greatest percentage of decisions that invoke only one type 
will refer to treaties, as displayed in the data of Figure 7.90 The 
proposition clearly holds true for the High Court of Australia, though 
the share of decisions citing only treaties declines quite steadily over 
the 20 years and the percentage of decisions referring only to other 
types—international courts, soft law, CIL—becomes notable in three 
of the later years. The proposition is partially true for the Canadian 
Supreme Court—in six of the eleven years—and is true of the South 
African Constitutional Court in three of nine years. The CCSA is 
particularly unlikely to cite only one type of ILM, as shown by the 
number of years in which no decisions cited only one type of 
international legal material. Still, even in South Africa, treaties are the 
type most commonly cited alone. From this view of the data, the 
proposition that courts will cite treaties more readily than they invoke 
other types of international legal materials is generally confirmed, 
with variation across countries. 
Finally, we can test the extent to which courts tend to invoke 
treaties more readily than they do other types of ILM by calculating 
the following ratio:  the odds that a decision will cite treaties but not 
international courts or soft law, divided by the odds that a decision 
will cite international courts—or soft law—but not the other two 
types. Table 2 reports those ratios.91 The data confirm that in all three 
courts, treaty citations are much more likely to occur alone—without 
citations to international courts or soft law—than are the other two 
types. The tendency is stronger with respect to soft law than it is 
regarding international courts. 

90. See infra fig.7.  
91. See infra tbl. 2. This analysis excludes customary international law (“CIL”) because 
references to CIL are too rare to permit statistically significant cross-tabulations. 
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B. Proposition 2: Citations to International Courts and Soft Law Are 
More Likely to Occur When Courts Cite Treaties.  
A pair of illustrations illustrate the claim that courts are less 
likely to invoke international decisions and soft law for their own 
sake, but rather in conjunction with references to treaty law. In S. v. 
Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled that the 
death penalty violated South Africa’s Constitution.92 The Court 
invoked both foreign law and international law as it interpreted rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. One of the treaties examined by the 
Court was the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
For guidance in interpreting provisions of the ICCPR regarding the 
right to life and cruel and inhuman punishment, the Court referred to 
an opinion of the Human Rights Committee.93 The Court also 
consulted the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to 

92. See S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.pdf. 
93. See id. ¶¶ 63–67. 
Table 2 
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similar norms and cited decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights to aid it in interpreting those norms.94 
A 2001 case, R. v. Sharpe, asked the Supreme Court of Canada 
to decide whether laws criminalizing the possession of child 
pornography violated the Charter right to free expression under Sec. 
2, or whether such laws were justified by limitations permitted by 
Sec. 1 of the Charter.95 In an opinion concurring in the outcome but 
reaching a different conclusion with respect to the constitutionality of 
one provision of the Criminal Code, Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, 
Gonthier, and Bastarache turned to international norms to aid in the 
interpretation of Charter rights, noting that “[w]hile this Court has 
recognized that, generally, international norms are not binding 
without legislative implementation, they are relevant sources for 
interpreting rights domestically.”96 The opinion then turned first to 
treaties—Convention on the Rights of the Child, ICCPR—and then to 
soft law—the General Assembly Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child and the UN Commission on Human Rights Programme of 
Action for the Prevention of the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, 
and Child Pornography—to establish the weight to be given to norms 
protective of children. Charter provisions and the Criminal Code, the 
justices argued, should be understood in the context of international 
norms to which Canada had subscribed.97 
As illustrated by the Makwanyane and Sharpe cases, citations to 
treaties can serve as a “bridge” to other types of legal materials.98  
International court decisions and soft law documents are not law in 
themselves but they can help courts to interpret the meaning, scope, 
and application of treaty provisions. Of course, domestic courts can 
refer to soft law materials for reasons other than treaty interpretation, 
for example, for evidence of customary international law. Shelton 
notes that courts increasingly refer to soft law materials for their 
persuasive authority with respect to human rights questions.99 But 
much of the usage of soft law is probably driven by the use of treaty 
law by domestic courts. I suggested, therefore, that references to soft 

94. See id. ¶¶ 63–67. 
95. R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (Can.). 
96. Id. ¶ 175. 
97. See id. ¶¶ 177–79. 
98. See Waters, supra note 3, at 667 nn.187–90. 
99. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 14–15. 
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law and international courts should tend to occur in decisions in 
which judges invoke treaties.   
As an example, the HCA referred to soft law in order to clarify 
treaty law in deciding LK v. Director-General, Department of 
Community Service.100 The Court was asked to resolve a dispute over 
whether four children living with their mother in Australia should be 
ordered to return to Israel following a demand from the children’s 
Israeli father. Australia and Israel were both parties to the Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Abduction 
Convention”).101 Australia’s Family Law Act of 1975 provides for 
regulations to enable Australia to fulfill its obligations under the 
Abduction Convention. The Regulations created under the Act 
provide “that they are to be construed having regard to the principles 
and objects mentioned in the preamble to and Art 1 of the Abduction 
Convention.”102 The key to the dispute was the forum state in which 
disputes between parents should be resolved, and that issue centered 
entirely on the determination of the “child’s country of habitual 
residence.”103 In determining the habitual residence of the children 
who were the subject of this dispute, the Court referred not only to the 
Abduction Convention but to ten other treaties produced in the 
framework of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
and then to the soft law Explanatory Report published by the 
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law.104  
Similarly, in an appeal over rejected applications for temporary 
protection visas, the High Court of Australia turned to both treaty and 
soft law in order to elucidate the requirements of Australia’s 1958 
Migration Act.105 The Court sought to clarify the obligations Australia 
held regarding holders of protection visas and the obligations owed by 
the state to the spouses and dependents of persons in possession of 
such visas. The Court referred to the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 

100. LK v. Dir.-Gen., Dep't of Cmty. Servs. (2009) 237 CLR 582 (Austl.). 
101. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, Hague XXVIII [hereinafter Abduction 
Convention]. 
102. Id. art. 2 (emphasis added). 
103. LK, 237 CLR at para. 6. 
104. See id. ¶¶ 21–29. 
105. See Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2003) 
211 CLR 441 (Austl.). 
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Refugees. In order to interpret the treaties, the Court also quoted from 
the 1992 version of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status, issued by the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees.106 
The SCC offers clear examples of citing international courts in 
connection with references to treaty law. In Mugesera v. Canada, the 
Court noted that “[g]enocide is a crime originating in international 
law,” and that “[i]nternational law is thus called upon to play a crucial 
role as an aid in interpreting domestic law, particularly as regards the 
elements of the crime of incitement to genocide.”107 The Court 
pointed out that both Rwanda and Canada were bound by the 
Genocide Convention, then referred to an advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice establishing that the norm against 
genocide was also part of customary international law.108 The 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court emphasizes “[t]he importance of 
interpreting domestic law in a manner that accords with the principles 
of customary international law and with Canada’s treaty 
obligations,”109 which meant that “international sources like the recent 
jurisprudence of international criminal courts are highly relevant to 
the analysis.”110 International jurisprudence was especially useful 
because there was no Canadian jurisprudence on the offense of 
“advocating genocide.” The Court then referred to two cases from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Prosecutor v. Akayesu,111 
and Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze,112 in order to 
establish the elements of the crime of incitement to genocide.113 
The South African Constitutional Court has engaged in similar 
practices. In Masiya v. Director of Public Prosecutions the CCSA 
was asked to decide an appeal of a man convicted of rape.114 The 

106. See id. ¶¶ 19–22. 
107. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 
100, 134 (Can.). 
108. See id. ¶ 82. 
109. Id. (discussing Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 817 (Can.)). 
110. Id. 
111. See id. ¶¶ 83–89, 132–55 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 
Judgment, (Sept. 2, 1998)).  
112. See id. ¶ 85 (citing Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. 
ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, (Dec. 3, 2003)).  
113. See id. ¶¶ 83–89. 
114. See Masiya v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2007/9.pdf. 
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Court had to determine whether the common law definition of rape 
should be extended to include non-consensual anal penetration.  If so, 
could Masiya be convicted of rape “even though the definition of rape 
did not include non-consensual anal penetration at the time the crime 
was committed”?115 In deciding whether applying the developed 
definition of rape to the present case violated the principle of legality, 
Judge Nkabinde referred to the principle of legality in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and to various decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights interpreting that principle.116 In his 
separate opinion, Chief Judge Langa argued that the Court should 
develop the common law of rape even further—to include non-
consensual anal penetration of males. Chief Judge Langa invoked the 
Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court as well as 
decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in support 
of an expanded definition.117 
Figure 8 shows with broader evidence the degree to which 
decisions include multiple types of ILM citations.118 Only in Australia 
does the largest number of decisions invoke only one type, and even 
there 30% of all decisions that cite international law include citations 
to more than one type. In Canada and South Africa, 59% and 65%, 
respectively, of decisions with citations to ILM include more than one 
type. For the latter two countries, when the court cites any kind of 
international legal material, it is likely to cite others. 
 
 
 
 

115. Id. ¶ 47. 
116. Id. ¶¶ 52–53. 
117. Id. ¶¶ 84–87. 
118. See infra fig.8. 
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Table 3 offers another perspective on this question.119 Table 3 
displays the odds that a decision that cites one type will also include 
at least one other type of ILM citation. If my argument is correct—
that international courts and soft law are more likely to be cited as 
subsidiary means of identifying international norms—then 
international court citations and soft law references will tend to be 
cited in decisions that also cite other types of international legal 
materials. For any given country, then, the odds reported in Table 3 
should be greater for international court and soft law citations than 
they are for treaty references. The most relevant comparisons are 
within countries: the values in the second and third rows under a 
country should be greater than the value in the first. In general, that is 
the case. Only in decisions from South Africa’s Constitutional Court 
are treaty references about as likely as international court references 

119. See infra tbl. 3.  
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to occur along with other types in the same decision. The CCSA, in 
other words, does not favor treaty citations as strongly as the other 
two courts do. However, in all three courts, soft law citations are 
consistently more likely than international court or treaty citations to 
occur in decisions that include one or more of the other types of 
citations.  It is also worth noting that in 2011, HCA decisions never 
referred only to one type of material; rather, decisions that cited 
international law always invoked more than one type. The evidence 
shows that citations to these three types of international legal 
materials tend to occur together, but that international courts and soft 
law are more likely than treaties to be cited in decisions that also 
make reference to other types of international legal materials.   
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Odds that types of citations occur in decisions with the other main 
types 
  
If a decision cites this type of ILM 
. . . 
. . . the odds that it also cites at least 
one of the other two types are: 
Australia 
Treaties 0.5 
International courts 0.9 
Soft law 5.3 
Canada 
Treaties 2.3 
International courts 3.4 
Soft law 4.3 
South Africa 
Treaties 3.6 
International courts 3.4 
Soft law 6.8 
Note:  The odds are the ratio of the probability that a condition holds 
divided by the probability that it does not.  The denominator for all of the 
odds reported here is the probability that a decision including the 
indicated type of citation does not also include one of the other two main 
types. 
The table excludes citations to customary international law, which are too 
rare. 
    Table 3 
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CONCLUSION 
Domestic courts from diverse legal traditions and in every region 
of the world invoke international legal materials in resolving disputes 
brought before them. I argued that references to international legal 
materials by domestic courts are being driven in large part by the 
internationalization of human rights law, the expansion of rights 
review, and the incentives and motivations of judges. I offered two 
propositions, first, that treaties would be more frequently cited than 
other ILM, and, second, that references to international judicial 
decisions and soft law would be more likely in decisions that refer to 
treaty law. The data showed that by far the largest number of 
domestic cases citing ILM were in the rights domain. The evidence 
also demonstrates that domestic courts do cite treaties more often than 
the other types of international legal materials—with some intriguing 
exceptions—but also that courts are surprisingly willing to cite the 
decisions of international courts, customary international law, and soft 
law. The analysis confirms that the various types of international legal 
materials tend to “cluster”—a decision that cites one type is likely to 
cite at least one other.   
Clearly, there is a great deal more to learn about how domestic 
legal systems articulate with international law. This study has raised 
questions specific to the countries and courts examined: why does the 
High Court of Australia rely more on treaties and less on international 
court decisions or soft law when it does invoke ILM? Why are the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa more inclined to make use of international judicial decisions 
and soft law, even in the absence of references to treaties? But more 
broadly, that the propositions offered in this Study find general 
support suggests that the arguments are plausible and could fruitfully 
be assessed with respect to a larger set of countries and courts. 
Another implication of the analysis is that a system of global and 
national human rights law is emerging, one that is by no means fully 
integrated—or monist—but one that is also unlike the separate and 
parallel legal systems of idealized dualism. What appears to be 
developing is a network of legal systems that are linked, loosely and 
unevenly, through a nexus in international law. The linkages among 
national, regional, and international legal regimes may be creating an 
“inter-dependent global system of law.”120 Whether or not such a 

120. Shelton, supra note 6, at 22. 
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system emerges, it is clear that domestic courts are connecting 
international norms with national law.

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